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T
he financial crisis of 2008 was a liquidity crisis—
that is, a period when some creditworthy house-
holds and firms could not obtain sufficient liquid
(money) balances to complete necessary transactions. Most
visible was the closure of the repurchase agreement (repo)
market, in which both banks and non-banking firms alike
typically exchange securities for short-term cash.
The Federal Reserve responded to the crisis by initiat-
ing an extraordinary set of assistance programs under the
authority of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.1 An
unusual aspect of these programs was that they sought to
assist individual firms or industries. In normal times, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) sets a target for
the federal funds rate and enforces it by changing the size
of the Fed’s balance sheet to change the aggregate amount
of liquidity that it provides to financial markets. The allo-
cation of liquidity among households and firms, in turn,
is determined by financial markets. Beyond the liquidity
crises of individual firms, an interesting question is whether
the aggregate amount of liquidity in the economy was
appropriate before and during the crisis: Was there a liquid-




(MSI) published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis pro-
vide some evidence.2 These




time deposits, and money mar-
ket mutual funds [MMMF])
furnish “monetary services” that
households and firms use to buy
and sell goods and services.
Some assets are immediately
media of exchange (e.g., cur-
rency), while others are not (e.g., saving deposits and
small-denomination time deposits). The MSI are chained-
weighted index numbers (similar to those used to measure
gross domestic product) that combine observed market
data on financial asset quantities and own rates of return
in order to measure these flows of monetary services. The
own rates of return received by households and firms on
their monetary assets, compared with broader market rates
of return, provide measures of the opportunity cost of the
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NOTE: The shaded areas indicate intervals between the National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle 
peaks and troughs. 
Federal Reserve programs during 
the recent financial crisis sought to
provide liquidity to individual firms 
or industries. An interesting additional
question is whether the aggregate
amount of liquidity in the economy
was appropriate before and during 
the recent financial crisis.monetary services furnished by each asset. Economic and
statistical theory provides specific mathematical functions
with which to calculate the MSI as described in Anderson
and Jones (2011).
The chart shows five MSI. (These MSI differ with respect
to the number of included assets.3 The data are log levels,
each normalized to 1.0 in August 2001.) MSI-M1 contains
only currency and checkable deposits, and MSI-M2M
includes the assets in MSI-M1 plus savings deposits and
retail MMMF; both leveled out in 2004 as the FOMC
tightened its policy stance and later increased sharply
during the autumn of 2008. MSI-MZM includes the assets
in MSI-M2M plus institution-type MMMF; it accelerated
beginning mid-2007. MSI-M2 includes the assets in MSI-
M2M plus small-denomination time deposits, and MSI-ALL
includes all the assets of MSI-M2 plus institution-type
MMMF. These broader series grew more steadily both
before and during the crisis. Although the evidence is
mixed, the MSI overall suggest that monetary policy was
accommodative before the financial crisis when judged in
terms of liquidity. ■
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1 These programs are reviewed by Anderson and Gascon (2009, 2011).
2 See Anderson and Jones (2011). The Bank of England publishes similar measures
for the United Kingdom (Hancock, 2005). The use of index numbers to measure
the macroeconomic concept of money began with William Barnett; see Barnett
and Serletis (2000) and references therein. 
3 See Anderson and Jones (2011) for details.
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